Multiple Choice QuestionsThere is a fairly universal sentiment that the use of nuclear weapons is clearly contrary to
morality and that its production probably so, does not go far enough. These activities are
not only opposed to morality but also to law if the legal objection can be added to the moral,
the argument against the use and the manufacture of these weapons will considerably be
reinforced. Now the time is ripe to evaluate the responsibility of scientists who knowingly
use their expertise for the construction of such weapons, which has deleterious effect on
mankind.
To this must be added the fact that more than 50 percent of the skilled scientific manpower in
the world is now engaged in the armaments industry. How appropriate it is that all this
valuable skill should be devoted to the manufacture of weapons of death in a world of
poverty is a question that must touch the scientific conscience.
A meeting of biologists on the Long-Term Worldwide Biological consequences of nuclear war
added frightening dimension to those forecasts. Its report suggested that the long
biological effects resulting from climatic changes may at least be as serious as the immediate
ones. Sub-freezing temperatures, low light levels, and high doses of ionizing and ultraviolet
radiation extending for many months after a large-scale nuclear war could destroy the
biological support system of civilization, at least in the Northern Hemisphere.
Productivity in natural and agricultural ecosystems could be severely restricted for a year or
more. Post war survivors would face starvation as well as freezing
conditions in the dark and be exposed to near lethal doses of radiation. If, as now seems
possible, the Southern Hemisphere were affected also, global disruption of the biosphere
could ensue. In any event, there would be severe consequences, even in the areas not
affected directly, because of the inter- dependence of the world economy. In either case
the extinction of a large fraction of the earth's animals, plants and microorganism seems
possible. The population size of Homo sapiens conceivably could be reduced to prehistoric
levels or below, and extinction of the human species itself cannot be excluded.
It appears from the passage that the use of nuclear weapons is considered against
morality by
Only such of those nations who cannot afford to manufacture and sell
weapons
Almost all the nations of the world
Only the superpowers who can afford to manufacture and sell weapons
Only the superpowers who can afford to manufacture and sell weapons
B.
Almost all the nations of the world
There is a fairly universal sentiment that the use of nuclear weapons is clearly contrary to
morality and that its production probably so, does not go far enough. These activities are
not only opposed to morality but also to law if the legal objection can be added to the moral,
the argument against the use and the manufacture of these weapons will considerably be
reinforced. Now the time is ripe to evaluate the responsibility of scientists who knowingly
use their expertise for the construction of such weapons, which has deleterious effect on
mankind.
To this must be added the fact that more than 50 percent of the skilled scientific manpower in
the world is now engaged in the armaments industry. How appropriate it is that all this
valuable skill should be devoted to the manufacture of weapons of death in a world of
poverty is a question that must touch the scientific conscience.
A meeting of biologists on the Long-Term Worldwide Biological consequences of nuclear war
added frightening dimension to those forecasts. Its report suggested that the long
biological effects resulting from climatic changes may at least be as serious as the immediate
ones. Sub-freezing temperatures, low light levels, and high doses of ionizing and ultraviolet
radiation extending for many months after a large-scale nuclear war could destroy the
biological support system of civilization, at least in the Northern Hemisphere.
Productivity in natural and agricultural ecosystems could be severely restricted for a year or
more. Post war survivors would face starvation as well as freezing
conditions in the dark and be exposed to near lethal doses of radiation. If, as now seems
possible, the Southern Hemisphere were affected also, global disruption of the biosphere
could ensue. In any event, there would be severe consequences, even in the areas not
affected directly, because of the inter- dependence of the world economy. In either case
the extinction of a large fraction of the earth's animals, plants and microorganism seems
possible. The population size of Homo sapiens conceivably could be reduced to prehistoric
levels or below, and extinction of the human species itself cannot be excluded.
Which of the following statements I, II, III and IV is definitely true in the context of the
passage?
There is every likelihood of survival of the human species as a consequence of nuclear war
Nuclear war risks and harmful effects are highly exaggerated.
The post war survivors would be exposed to the benefits of non-lethal radiation
The post war survivors would be exposed to the benefits of non-lethal radiation
The export gains many countries came to associate with a rule-based system.
The higher priority on export gains placed by many countries at the Uruguay
Round
The provision of a rule-based system by the WTO.
The provision of a rule-based system by the WTO.
The World Trade Organisation (WTO) was created in the early 1990s as a component of
the Uruguay Round negotiation. However, it could have been negotiated as part of the
Tokyo Round of the 1970s, since negotiation was an attempt at a ‘constitutional reform’
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Or it could have been put off to
the future, as the US government wanted. What factors led to the creation of the WTO in
the early 1990s? One factor was the pattern of multilateral bargaining that developed late
in the Uruguay Round. Like all complex international agreements, the WTO was a
product of a series of trade-offs between principal actors and groups. For the United
States, which did not want a new organization, the disputed settlement part of the WTO
package achieved its longstanding goal of a more effective and more legal dispute
settlement system. For the Europeans, who by the 1990s had come to view GATT
dispute settlement less in political terms add more as a regime of legal obligations, the
WTO package was acceptable as a means to discipline the resort to unilateral measures
by the United States. Countries like Canada and other middle and smaller trading
partners were attracted by the expansion of a rule-based system and by the symbolic
value of a trade organization, both of which inherently support the weak against the
strong. The developing countries were attracted due to the provisions banning unilateral
measures. Finally, and perhaps most important, many countries at the Uruguay Round
came to put a higher priority on the export gains than on the import losses that the
negotiation would produce, and they came to associate the WTO and a rule-based
system with those gains. This reasoning – replicated in many countries – was contained
in U. S. Ambassador Kantor’s defence of the WTO, and it announced to a recognition
that international trade and its benefits cannot be enjoyed unless trading nations accept
the discipline of a negotiated rule-based environment. A second factor in the creation of
the WTO was pressure from lawyers and the legal process. The dispute settlement
system of the WTO was seen as a victory of legalists but the matter went deeper than
that. The GATT, and the WTO, are contract organizations based on rules, and it is
inevitable that an organization creating a further rule will in turn be influenced by legal
process. Robert Hudee has written of the ‘momentum of legal development’, but what is
this precisely? Legal development can be defined as promotion of the technical legal
values of consistency, clarity (or certainty) and effectiveness; these are values that those
responsible for administering any legal system will seek to maximize. As it played out in
the WTO, consistency meant integrating under one roof the whole lot of separate
agreements signed under GATT auspices; clarity meant removing ambiguities about the
powers of contracting parties to make certain decisions or to undertake waivers; and
effectiveness meant eliminating exceptions arising out of grandfather-rights and
resolving defects in dispute settlement procedures and institutional provisions. Concern
for these values is inherent in any rule-based system of co-operation, since without these
value rules would be meaningless in the first place, therefore, create their own incentive
for fulfilment. The moment of legal development has occurred in other institutions
besides the GATT, most notably in the European Union (EU). Over the past two decades
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has consistently rendered decisions that have
expanded incrementally the EU’s internal market, in which the doctrine of ‘mutual
recognition’ handed down in Cassis de Dijon case in 1979 was a key turning point. The
court is now widely recognized as a major player in European integration, even though
arguably such a strong role was not originally envisaged in the Treaty of Rome, which
initiated the current European Union. One means the Court used to expand integration
was the ‘teleological method of interpretation’, whereby the actions of member states
were evaluated against ‘the accomplishment of the most elementary goals set forth in the
Preamble to the (Rome) treaty. The teleological method represents an effort to keep
current policies consistent with slated goals, and it is analogous to the effort in GATT to
keep contracting party trade practices consistent with slated rules. In both cases legal
concerns and procedures are an independent force for further co-operation.
In the large part the WTO was an exercise in consolidation. In the context of a trade
negotiation that created a near-revolutionary expansion of international trade rules, the
formation of the WTO was a deeply conservative act needed to ensure that the benefits
of the new rules would not be lost. The WTO was all about institutional structure and
dispute settlement: these are the concerns of conservatives and not revolutionaries, that
is why lawyers and legalists took the lead on these issues. The WTO codified the GATT
institutional practice that had developed by custom over three decades, and it
incorporated a new dispute settlement system that was necessary to keep both old and
new rules from becoming a sham. Both the international structure and the dispute
settlement system were necessary to preserve and enhance the integrity of the
multilateral trade regime that had been built incrementally from the 1940s to the 1990s.
What would be the closest reason why WTO was not formed in 1970s?
The US government did not like it.
Important players did not find it in their best interest to do so
Lawyers did not work for the dispute settlement system
Lawyers did not work for the dispute settlement system
The World Trade Organisation (WTO) was created in the early 1990s as a component of
the Uruguay Round negotiation. However, it could have been negotiated as part of the
Tokyo Round of the 1970s, since negotiation was an attempt at a ‘constitutional reform’
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Or it could have been put off to
the future, as the US government wanted. What factors led to the creation of the WTO in
the early 1990s? One factor was the pattern of multilateral bargaining that developed late
in the Uruguay Round. Like all complex international agreements, the WTO was a
product of a series of trade-offs between principal actors and groups. For the United
States, which did not want a new organization, the disputed settlement part of the WTO
package achieved its longstanding goal of a more effective and more legal dispute
settlement system. For the Europeans, who by the 1990s had come to view GATT
dispute settlement less in political terms add more as a regime of legal obligations, the
WTO package was acceptable as a means to discipline the resort to unilateral measures
by the United States. Countries like Canada and other middle and smaller trading
partners were attracted by the expansion of a rule-based system and by the symbolic
value of a trade organization, both of which inherently support the weak against the
strong. The developing countries were attracted due to the provisions banning unilateral
measures. Finally, and perhaps most important, many countries at the Uruguay Round
came to put a higher priority on the export gains than on the import losses that the
negotiation would produce, and they came to associate the WTO and a rule-based
system with those gains. This reasoning – replicated in many countries – was contained
in U. S. Ambassador Kantor’s defence of the WTO, and it announced to a recognition
that international trade and its benefits cannot be enjoyed unless trading nations accept
the discipline of a negotiated rule-based environment. A second factor in the creation of
the WTO was pressure from lawyers and the legal process. The dispute settlement
system of the WTO was seen as a victory of legalists but the matter went deeper than
that. The GATT, and the WTO, are contract organizations based on rules, and it is
inevitable that an organization creating a further rule will in turn be influenced by legal
process. Robert Hudee has written of the ‘momentum of legal development’, but what is
this precisely? Legal development can be defined as promotion of the technical legal
values of consistency, clarity (or certainty) and effectiveness; these are values that those
responsible for administering any legal system will seek to maximize. As it played out in
the WTO, consistency meant integrating under one roof the whole lot of separate
agreements signed under GATT auspices; clarity meant removing ambiguities about the
powers of contracting parties to make certain decisions or to undertake waivers; and
effectiveness meant eliminating exceptions arising out of grandfather-rights and
resolving defects in dispute settlement procedures and institutional provisions. Concern
for these values is inherent in any rule-based system of co-operation, since without these
value rules would be meaningless in the first place, therefore, create their own incentive
for fulfilment. The moment of legal development has occurred in other institutions
besides the GATT, most notably in the European Union (EU). Over the past two decades
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has consistently rendered decisions that have
expanded incrementally the EU’s internal market, in which the doctrine of ‘mutual
recognition’ handed down in Cassis de Dijon case in 1979 was a key turning point. The
court is now widely recognized as a major player in European integration, even though
arguably such a strong role was not originally envisaged in the Treaty of Rome, which
initiated the current European Union. One means the Court used to expand integration
was the ‘teleological method of interpretation’, whereby the actions of member states
were evaluated against ‘the accomplishment of the most elementary goals set forth in the
Preamble to the (Rome) treaty. The teleological method represents an effort to keep
current policies consistent with slated goals, and it is analogous to the effort in GATT to
keep contracting party trade practices consistent with slated rules. In both cases legal
concerns and procedures are an independent force for further co-operation.
In the large part the WTO was an exercise in consolidation. In the context of a trade
negotiation that created a near-revolutionary expansion of international trade rules, the
formation of the WTO was a deeply conservative act needed to ensure that the benefits
of the new rules would not be lost. The WTO was all about institutional structure and
dispute settlement: these are the concerns of conservatives and not revolutionaries, that
is why lawyers and legalists took the lead on these issues. The WTO codified the GATT
institutional practice that had developed by custom over three decades, and it
incorporated a new dispute settlement system that was necessary to keep both old and
new rules from becoming a sham. Both the international structure and the dispute
settlement system were necessary to preserve and enhance the integrity of the
multilateral trade regime that had been built incrementally from the 1940s to the 1990s.
In the method of interpretation of the European Court of Justice:
Actions against member states needed to be evaluated against the said community goals.
Enunciation of the most elementary community goals needed to be emphasized
Current policies need to be consistent with stated goals.
Current policies need to be consistent with stated goals.
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